An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis involving 10 primary cases, as well as several additional presumptive primary cases, occurred among third-year veterinary medical students in October 2011. The investigation revealed that the outbreak was associated with a laboratory exercise involving euthanized dairy calves that were naturally infected with Cryptosporidium parvum, and was exacerbated by inappropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), the unsuitable location of the laboratory, and the absence of appropriate hand hygiene. The lab location was such that students lacked an area where contaminated outer clothing could be removed safely, resulting in the potential for secondary spread. One additional case probably resulted from secondary spread. The institutional biosafety officer and the chair of the college occupational safety committee worked with teaching faculty and the Dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine and other stakeholders to create and implement a series of control measures to minimize the potential for future infections among students. Control measures included prescreening of donor calves and culling of infected animals, changing the location of the laboratory to a facility where suitable hand hygiene and sanitation are accessible, using more robust PPE, removing and laundering of protective clothing on location, and better training for students exposed to potential sources of zoonotic pathogens. Since implementation of these control measures, several cycles of instruction have been completed with no additional infections. This case study illustrates the need for university biosafety professionals to proactively assist academic faculty and students by providing guidance for instructional activities involving possible biohazards.
Introduction
In 1907, Tyzzer (Tyzzer, 1907) first described Cryptosporidium infection in mice, but not until the 1980s when AIDS patients began dying from Cryptosporidium infections was it recognized as an important pathogen of humans (Current et al., 1983) . In 1993, a large outbreak infecting over 400,000 people occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin as a result of the failure of a municipal water treatment facility (MacKenzie et al., 1995) . Today, Cryptosporidium spp. are recognized as common sporozoan parasites present in many animal species and are an important and difficult-to-control cause of zoonotic human gastrointestinal illness (Xiao, 2010; Xiao & Feng, 2008) . There are currently 8,000-10,000 documented cases (CDC, 2015) , and probably many unreported cases annually in the U.S.
In immune-competent humans, infection with Cryptosporidium spp. is generally self-limiting, but shedding can occur for a month or more after symptoms subside. In immune-compromised hosts, the infection becomes chronic, as a result of re-infection within the intestinal tract and subsequent amplification of the parasite during its life cycle (Janoff & Reller, 1987) , and can be life-threatening. Most human infections occur as a result of swallowing contaminated water. Consumption of contaminated food, direct and indirect contact, and even aerosol are additional important routes of human exposure. Cryptosporidium is one of the few zoonotic pathogens capable of sustained human-tohuman spread (Janoff & Reller, 1987) , which has led to numerous outbreaks in daycare centers, retirement homes, and other settings where contact and fecal/oral transmission opportunities abound (Herwaldt, 2001) . House flies have also been shown to spread Cryptosporidium (Graczyk et al., 1999) .
Numerous species are within the genus Cryptosporidium (Fayer, 2010; Xiao & Fayer, 2008) , but the most common species associated with human illness in the developed world is C. parvum (Xiao & Fayer, 2008) . The principal reservoir of C. parvum for human infections is domestic cattle, in particular dairy calves younger than 2 months, and much less frequently in beef calves (Kvac et al., 2006) . Older cattle rarely are colonized with C. parvum, but rather C. bovis and C. andersoni (Feng et al., 2007) . There is a growing recognition that runoff waste from dairies and other cattle operations is an important source of contamination that can initiate downstream outbreaks (Sischo et al., 2000) . Animal husbandry steps to minimize the risk of surface water contamination have been proposed and in some areas implemented that can minimize risks (Harp & Goff, 1998) . It is estimated that Cryptosporidium parvum is endemic in approximately 90% of dairies in the U.S., as well as being present in up to 97% of surface water supplies (Ramirez et al., 2004) .
Cryptosporidium spp. requires only a single host to complete its life cycle, which occurs in the gastrointestinal tract-primarily the small intestine and colon. Developmental stages occur within vesicles in the luminal surfaces of the intestinal tract. Two types of oocysts, termed the thinwalled oocysts and thick-walled oocysts, are formed during the life cycle. After release the thin-walled oocysts enter new host cells to initiate new rounds of replication, thus amplifying the infection (Janoff & Reller, 1987) . This observation helps explain chronic infection in immunodeficient hosts and long-term shedding in many immunecompetent hosts. The thick-walled oocysts pass out of the intestinal tract into the environment and are the infectious form of the parasite for humans and animals (Janoff & Reller, 1987) .
The incubation period for cryptosporidiosis in humans is 1-12 days, with an average of 7 days. Signs and symptoms include diarrhea, bloody stools, nausea, vomiting, cramps, fatigue, headache, fever, chills, and myalgia. In the immune-competent host these signs and symptoms resolve after a period ranging from a few days to 30 days, with usual duration being 1-2 weeks. Shedding may occur for several more weeks or even months after signs and symptoms resolve. Immune-deficient persons will develop serious, chronic cryptosporidiosis that may be fatal (Chalmers & Davies, 2010) . Such individuals will generally clear the infection when the source of immune suppression is removed. When the underlying immunodeficiency is due to HIV/AIDS, infection with Cryptosporidium spp. becomes a life-threatening complication that affects as many as 20% of AIDS patients (Chalmers & Davies, 2010; Chin, 2000) .
Oocysts shed from infected animals and humans pose three important risk factors that need consideration: the extent of shedding and contamination, chemical resistance, and infectious dose. Environmental surfaces and water often become heavily contaminated from infected animals. Infected calves shed as many as 10 10 oocysts per day, and contact with calves and contaminated surfaces is an important occupational hazard for farm workers and veterinarians. Oocysts that contaminate water remain viable for over 140 days and are highly resistant to chlorine and other common water treatment chemicals (Hooda et al., 2000) . Surface decontamination using bleach and other common disinfectants is ineffective (Korich et al., 1990) . These factors compound the risk of infection, which is already high because a single oocyst is sufficient to produce infection and disease in a susceptible host (Pereira et al., 2002) .
Most human infections are caused by a small number of genotypes of C. parvum and C. hominus with geographic differences reported in disease burdens caused by these two species (Xiao & Fayer, 2008) . Transmission of C. parvum in humans is mainly anthroponotic in developing countries. In developed countries like the U.S., transmission is primarily zoonotic (Xiao, 2010; Feltus et al., 2006) .
Exposure Incident
This incident came to light when the university occupational medicine clinic notified the institutional biological safety officer and the county Health Department that initially one, then within a few days, several additional students had presented with acute gastrointestinal symptoms. Subsequent investigations quickly identified that all the affected individuals were veterinary medical third-year students, and all had participated 1 week prior in the same class activity. The class was a hands-on learning activity associated with a theriogenology course. The purpose of the activity was to provide students with experience extracting a calf during dystocia births and practicing fetotomy (i.e., the dissection of a dead fetus in utero) (Mortimer & Toombs, 1993) . To make the activity as realistic as possible, euthanized newborn dairy calves were obtained from two local dairies, frozen until use, and then thawed and placed along with water (to simulate amniotic fluid) inside a neoprene synthetic uterine device (Figure 1 ). The students practiced reaching inside the uterine device, manipulating the calves into position, and extracting them. The students also practiced the fetotomy procedure, which involved cutting through calf tissue (including intestine) using serrated wire.
Results

Investigations and Findings
Two parallel investigations were conducted with some coordination: an internal university investigation conducted by the biological safety officer and an epidemiology investigation conducted by the County Health Department, with assistance from the state Health Authority, Public Health Division. The findings of those two investigations are described here.
Biosafety Investigation
The biosafety investigation included interviews with the course instructor and ill students, and visits to the facility where the lab activity was conducted. Topics investigated were the type, use, and removal of PPE, hand hygiene, source of calves used, content of safety information and instructions provided to students, and the oversight of PPE use during the activity by supervising faculty.
The facility where the laboratory activity was conducted, inside a large barn on the campus, was found to be unsuitable for an activity involving possible biohazards. The barn at one time had been a dairy barn, but animals are no longer housed there. A small restroom is located in a distant part of the building with a sink and handwashing supplies. In the immediate area where the activity was conducted, a cold-water hose and hand soap were the only handwashing facilities available. Student interviews revealed that the students were not instructed to use the restroom for handwashing, and some did not know a restroom was located in the building. Students hosed down the area after the activity and rinsed their hands using the hose. Some students may have used the soap provided; however, the outside of the hose was likely contaminated as it was being handled both by students wearing gloves and by students with bare hands. One student interviewed stated that she washed her hands thoroughly only after returning to another campus building.
PPE available at the location included standard nitrile gloves and shoulder-length disposable sleeves. Students
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were instructed to wear coveralls and rubber boots to class on the day of the activity. The activity itself involved reaching into the synthetic uterus to manipulate calves. The class demographics were such that students were predominantly female, and many of the women were of small stature making reaching far enough into the uterine devices difficult. To reach far enough into the devices, some students had to place their faces against the opening of the uterine device resulting in contact with contaminated fluids. No surgical masks or eye protection were provided. Cloth coveralls became heavily contaminated. No provision was made for the removal of contaminated coveralls and a number of the students walked to another building to remove them in locker facilities in the main teaching hospital complex, potentially spreading contamination to other areas. In addition, students interviewed stated that some students removed gloves and sleeves during the activity because they could not achieve sufficient dexterity while wearing this PPE, particularly the sleeves that were "onesize-fits-all" protection. As a consequence, students became saturated with fluids and had direct skin contact with tissues and fluids from infected animals. Contaminated clothing was worn into other campus buildings or to students' homes prior to removal. The instructor for the laboratory activity was interviewed and stated that the activity was taught on four separate dates: September 28, 29 and October 5, 6, 2011. Calves had been obtained from two dairies in the area, Dairy 1 and Dairy 2. The instructor stated that the calves had no obvious signs of illness. Since the calf carcasses had been disposed of immediately after the laboratory activity, examination by a pathologist was not possible. The instructor stated that gloves and sleeves had been made available, but PPE use had not been enforced and students had not received any safety information prior to or during the activity. The instructor stated that the exercise was intended to mimic the circumstances that a veterinarian would encounter in practice, and that no additional protective measures would be employed in a practice setting.
Public Health Investigation
The County Health Department and state Health Authority declared the incident an outbreak and conducted epidemiology investigations. Forty-seven of the 56 students in the third-year veterinary medicine class were interviewed and asked to complete a questionnaire, provided by the lead investigator from a similar outbreak at the Midwestern university veterinary school the previous year (unpublished). The case definition used was either 1) a laboratoryconfirmed case or 2) an individual with three or more loose stools within a 24-hour period within 12 days of participating in the theriogenology laboratory activity. Using these criteria, 10 primary cases were associated with this outbreak, two additional suspect cases did not meet the case definition, and one presumed secondary case was caused by household transmission from one of the primary cases.
The activity had been conducted on four different dates, due to limitations in equipment that did not allow all students to participate in a single session. Only students who participated in the laboratory activity on two of the dates developed cryptosporidiosis that met the case definition (Table 1) .
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Figure 1
Synthetic uterine device used to practice dystocia births and fetotomy in the theriogenology class where the outbreak occurred. Dead calves and water were placed into the device prior to the activity. The students reached through the opening to manipulate the calves and extract them. www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 20, No. 3, 2015
Although calf carcasses were no longer available, fecal specimens were collected from one of the two dairies that had been the source of the calves used in the laboratory activity and from four of the primary human cases. The investigators collected a total of nine calf fecal specimens from Dairy 2 on October 28. No samples could be collected from Dairy 1. All of the samples, human and bovine, were analyzed by molecular typing at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and Environmental Diseases Laboratory. All of the four human specimens were found to contain Cryptosporidium parvum subtype IIaA15G2R1. One of the nine animal fecal specimens matched this subtype, directly linking the calf source with the human illness. Five of the other bovine specimens contained isolates of Cryptosporidium spp. (C. bovis, C. ryanae, and C. parvum) but not the subtype that infected the students. Three of the bovine specimens did not yield any identifiable Cryptosporidium spp.
Most likely calves obtained from both dairies were contaminated, however, because calves used for the October 5 class (which resulted in six cases) were exclusively from Dairy 1, where no sampling was allowed.
Among the documented human cases, the typical onset of symptoms was 7 days, with a range of 7-9 days post exposure ( Figure 2 ). Symptoms persisted in some students for several weeks.
Biosafety Interventions
Several meetings were held among college administrators, health officials, and the university biosafety officer to assess what steps were needed to minimize the possibility of a reoccurrence of infections going forward. Additionally, the investigations identified a need to improve the safety culture in many classes and service activities within the college. In response to these concerns, the Dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine tasked the college occupation-
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Figure 2
Graph of documented primary cases of cryptosporidiosis among veterinary students participating in the epidemiology investigation. The exercise was conducted on 4 separate dates, indicated by the arrows below the X axis. No illnesses occurred after labs conducted on September 28 and October 6 (open arrows). Illnesses occurred among student who participated in the exercise on September 29 (black arrow, open bars) and October 5 (black arrow, crosshatch bars).
al safety committee, in conjunction with the university biosafety officer, with drafting recommendations for changes to improve safety in this specific course and college-wide. The college occupational safety committee chair organized a series of meetings over the next several months. Committee members were unified in their desire not only to use this incident as an opportunity to improve safety for the students in this specific laboratory exercise, but also to recommend changes that had the potential to improve safety for multiple educational and service activities that are part of the mission of the College of Veterinary Medicine.
Class-specific Changes
Several critical areas needed to be addressed to improve the safety of students for the theriogenology laboratory activity going forward: source of animals, location where the lab will be taught, type of PPE, enforcement of PPE use, and doffing protocols. The following recommendations were made by the safety committee and subsequently adopted by the Dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine: 1) Since most dairies have enzootic Cryptosporidium spp., locating a "clean" source of dairy calves in the area as a source of calves to be used in future activities was not deemed possible. Instead, the committee recommended that all calves to be used be pre-tested by the veterinary diagnostic laboratory prior to use, and any that test positive be culled from use in this laboratory activity. 2) An alternate teaching location that had an associated anteroom with multiple sinks allowing up to six students to simultaneously wash their hands after completing the tasks was identified and inspected. 3) Faculty instructors were encouraged to model and instruct students on the use of PPE prior to beginning the activities, and to enforce the use of PPE during all aspects of the activities. PPE would now also include mandatory face, eye, and hair protection to protect against splashes of liquid. Disposable full-body Tyvek™ type suits would be made available to students who wished to use them instead of standard washable coveralls. 4) Protocols were recommended for doffing PPE, which was to be placed into sealed containers for disposal or laundering onsite. Students were instructed to bring a change of clothing and a plastic bag on the day of the activity. Students would doff their PPE at the door leading to the anteroom as they exited the laboratory room, then immediately wash their hands and proceed to the locker rooms to change into their street clothing before attending other classes, eating or drinking, or leaving the building.
College-wide Changes
The occupational safety committee also recommended several college-wide changes to improve safety for students. These included adoption of a safety policy with the following elements: 1) Responsibility: The policy assigns responsibility and accountability for safety in all class activities. Instructors are responsible for the safety of all students, providing safety information to students and enforcing the use of appropriate PPE. Students are responsible for compliance with safety procedures and the use of PPE. 2) Awareness Training: All students attend biosafety awareness training during their first 3 years of the veterinary medicine curriculum. This training is provided by the university biosafety officer and covers the major hazards associated with the practice of veterinary medicine: zoonotic diseases; animal allergies; and chemical and biological hazards such as live vaccines, chemotherapeutic chemicals, formaldehyde, etc. 3) Inspections: In the fall, the college safety committee conducts annual inspections of all facilities to be used for training exercises or laboratory activities to ensure that all facilities meet the minimum requirements for safety. 4) PPE: All class activities are evaluated for appropriate PPE. 5) Safety Information: Each course will have a written safety standard operating procedure included in the syllabus; this document is developed by the instructors. The safety committee drafted a template to assist faculty in complying with this requirement. 6) Food/Drink: The policy prohibits food or drink for human consumption in laboratories or animal areas of the college.
Discussion
Cryptosporidiosis is a common occupational hazard for veterinarians, particularly those who work in large animal practices, and has been the cause of previous infections among veterinary students (Pohjola et al., 1986; Reif et al., 1989) and practicing veterinarians (Herwaldt, 2001) . Most infections probably go unreported. This report describes a 2011 outbreak involving at least 10 primary cases of cryptosporidiosis among third-year veterinary medical students, the subsequent investigations and findings, and corrective actions put into place in response to the outbreak. Two nearly identical outbreaks among veterinary medical students at other universities, also in theriogenology laboratories, occurred in 2010 (unpublished) and in 2015 (Drinkard et al., 2015) .
Infection of students was documented only among students who participated in two of the four lab sessions, on September 29 and October 5. The reasons for this are not clear, but may be due to a relatively small number of infectious calves among the total number of calves used for the laboratory. Possibly, the infectious calves were segregated only on these two dates. Since the calf carcasses were disposed of immediately after the laboratory activities were completed, testing them was not possible; this would have provided information that could have clarified the reason for this observation.
On the surface, the cause of the outbreak appeared to be the use of calves infected with and contaminated with Cryptosporidium parvum. However, the results of the investigation indicated that multiple biosafety lapses independently or cumulatively contributed to the cause of the outbreak. The root causes of the outbreak included inadequate access to and use of handwashing facilities, inadequate PPE, and use of contaminated source animals in the activity. An additional biosafety lapse was also identifiedthe wearing of contaminated protective clothing to other areas beyond the laboratory. The investigations also revealed systemic problems with some of those same factors throughout other teaching and service activities within the College of Veterinary Medicine. The biology of zoonotic Cryptosporidium spp. is not completely understood; however, clearly the principal source of infections for humans is cattle, particularly dairy calves (Xiao & Feng, 2008) , and a relatively small number of subtypes appear to be responsible for most human infections (Xiao & Fayer, 2008; Xiao & Feng, 2008) . In this report, sampling of animals from one of the dairies that provided the calves occurred several weeks after the animals were used in the laboratory activity, but did result in the identification of the same subtype of C. parvum that was identified in the four human specimens tested, subtype IIaA15G2R1. Most human infections are caused by subtypes of C. parvum that circulate in cattle and humans; other species in the genus Cryptosporidium appear to be more restricted in host range (Xiao & Fayer, 2008; Xiao & Feng, 2008) .
Surface water and environmental contamination are large problems for public health, because oocysts persist for months in water and are resistant to chlorine and other common disinfecting chemicals. The low infective doseas little as a single oocyst (Periera et al., 2002)-makes employment of effective PPE and scrupulous hand hygiene critical wherever this organism is suspect. When handling dairy calves, using precautions is prudent since such a high percentage of dairies harbor the agent.
In response to this outbreak, the College of Veterinary Medicine administration promptly assigned the college occupational safety committee the task of drafting safety recommendations for implementation both in this specific laboratory activity and college-wide in other courses and student activities. The laboratory now includes strict use of enhanced PPE and robust doffing procedures followed by handwashing and changing clothes. In addition, source animals are now tested prior to use in the laboratory. These interventions have so far proven effective; in the 3 years since this incident, no additional cases have been associated with this laboratory. College-wide changes include risk assessments for all laboratory courses, annual facility inspections by the occupational safety committee, and detailed information provided to students about zoonotic diseases and methods to reduce risk during their education and beyond.
